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With a particular rise since the turn of the millennium, cyber-security become one of the most 
important security sector in contemporary security politics.  Despite this, the convergence of 
cyberspace and security has mostly been analyzed within the context of technical areas and had 
been neglected in the political realm and international relations academia. The article argues that 
in line with developments in the domestic and international arena, the AKP government shifted 
towards the securitization of cyberspace. Secondly the article argues that there seems to be two 
waves of securitization and desecuritization within the case. The first wave starts from 2006 
through the end of 2017 whereby cyber securitization took place within the subunit level and very 
much connected to political and societal sectors. This first wave particularly heightened after the 
2016 attempted coup and the eventual collapse of the peace process with the PKK. The second 
wave came in the 2018 onwards and instead of securitization, there is a desecuritizationn of cyber 
attacks took place mostly at the unit level. In both waves, the desecuritization and securitization 
is constructed within the national security discourse. However in the first wave, a threat to national 
security is constructed and hypersecuritized particularly in relation to developments at the societal 
level. In the second wave, the emphasis is put on the strength of national security therefore the 
threats and cyber-attacks at the unit level that are originated from other states is downplayed in 
order to construct a national pride and strength.  The main goal of this article therefore is to fill 
the gap in the Copenhagen school related to cyber security sector.  The second aim is to fill the 
gap specifically in Turkey’s response to events in cyberspace and construction of a cybersecurity 
discourse and culture  
 





Con un aumento particular desde el cambio de milenio, la ciberseguridad se convirtió en 
uno de los sectores de seguridad más importantes en la política de seguridad 
contemporánea. A pesar de esto, la convergencia del ciberespacio y la seguridad se ha 
analizado principalmente en el contexto de las áreas técnicas y se ha descuidado en el 
ámbito político y la academia de relaciones internacionales. El artículo sostiene que, de 
acuerdo con los desarrollos en el ámbito nacional e internacional, el gobierno del AKP se 
inclinó hacia la titulización del ciberespacio. En segundo lugar, el artículo sostiene que 
parece haber dos oleadas de titulización y desecuritización dentro del caso. La primera 
ola comienza desde 2006 hasta fines de 2017, en la que la titulización cibernética tuvo 
lugar dentro del nivel de subunidades y muy conectada con los sectores políticos y 
sociales. Esta primera ola se intensificó particularmente después del intento de golpe de 
2016 y el eventual colapso del proceso de paz con el PKK. La segunda ola se produjo en 
el 2018 en adelante y en lugar de titulización, hay una desecuritización de los ataques 
cibernéticos que se llevaron a cabo principalmente a nivel de unidad. En ambas oleadas, 
la desecuritización y la titulización se construyen dentro del discurso de seguridad 
nacional. Sin embargo, en la primera ola, se construye y se hipersecuritiza una amenaza 
a la seguridad nacional, particularmente en relación con los desarrollos a nivel social. En 
la segunda ola, el énfasis se pone en la fuerza de la seguridad nacional, por lo que se 
minimizan las amenazas y ataques cibernéticos a nivel de unidad que se originan en otros 
estados para construir un orgullo y una fuerza nacional. Por lo tanto, el objetivo principal 
de este artículo es llenar el vacío en la escuela de Copenhague relacionado con el sector 
de la seguridad cibernética. El segundo objetivo es llenar el vacío específicamente en la 
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respuesta de Turquía a los eventos en el ciberespacio y la construcción de un discurso y 
una cultura de ciberseguridad. 
 
Palabras clave: Copenhagen School, titulización, ciberespacio, Turquía, 




with a particular rise since the turn of the millennium, cyber-security become one of the 
most important security sector in contemporary security politics.  despite this, the convergence of 
cyberspace and security has mostly been analyzed within the context of technical areas and had 
been neglected in the political realm and international relations academia.  
in the political realm the securitization of cyberspace has gained impetus following the 
cyber-attacks against the usa by china in 2006, against estonia in 2007 by russia , against syria by 
israel in 2007, against afghanistan by germany in 2008, against china by iran in 2010, and against 
iran by israel and the usa in 2010 (stuxnet). these incidents along with many more has led the 
countries to establish more clear-cut responses against cyber threats and cyber-attacks. in military-
strategic terms, cyberspace is accepted now as a domain equal to land, air, sea, and space (deibert 
& rohozinski, risking security: policies and paradoxes of cyberspace security., 2010, s. 16). 
with these developments there is an increasing literature regarding the relevance of cyber 
security within the framework of international relations (dunn cavelty & wenger, 2020; akdağ, 
2019; gill, 2019; stevens, 2018; collier, 2018; buchanan, 2016; valeriano & manessa, 2015; 
bıçakcı, 2014; tikk, 2011; dunn cavelty, 2013; kremer & müller, 2013; choucri, 2012; nye, 2011; 
hansen & nissenbaum, 2009; eriksson & giacomello, 2007; nissenbaum, 2005; nissenbaum, 2004; 
der derian, 2003; deibert, 2003; rosenau & singh, 2002; saco, 1999),  among those most of them 
focus on cyber security within the traditional framework of national security blocks such as the 
usa, china, the eu and russia  (rehrl, 2017; sharp, 2017; geers, 2014; cavelty dunn, kristensen, & 
soby, 2008; wilner, 2020; weber, 2018; deibert, rohozinski, & crete-nishihata, 2012; lobato & 
kenkel, 2015) and international norm-settings (lin, 2012; polański, 2017; mačák, 2017; porcedda, 
2018; georgieva, 2020).  there is a limited literature on critical security studies that focus on cyber 
security (saco, 1999)   and the conceptualization of copenhagen school (hansen & nissenbaum, 
2009; geelen, 2016; fouad, 2019; lacy & prince, 2018) within them main focus is on discourses of 
government officials (lobato & kenkel, 2015; lee & macdonald, 2016). cyber securitization 
literature remains very limited in research related to turkey and their main focus is on international 
relations in general (bıçakcı, ergun, & çelikpala, 2015). the remaining research taking turkey as 
case study either focus on the technical/ sectoral analysis (yesil, sözeri, & khazraee, 2017; sari, 
2019), legislation (taşçı & can, 2015), or social media analysis (bulut & yörük, 2017).  
as seen in the existing literature the concept of cybersecurity is still a novelty in many 
policy actors and academics. the main goal of this article therefore is to fill the gap in the 
copenhagen school related to cyber security sector.  the second aim is to fill the gap specifically 
in turkey’s response to events in cyberspace and construction of a cybersecurity discourse and 
culture.  the choice of copenhagen school for analyzing the state and cyberspace relationship is 
because it allows analyzing the interplay between different levels of analysis and different sectors. 
secondly securitization theory which blends well with the constructivist stand allows individual 
agents to be more active in constructing cyberspace as a national security concept (aydindag & 
ısiksal, (de) securitization of ıslam in turkey, 2018). however, there are certain gaps in copenhagen 
school with respect to individual level of analysis and the cybersecurity sector which is mainly 
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out of the five main sectors of securitization. hence the article will try to overcome these gaps, 
through a case study of turkey. 
the article analyzes these aspects through primary and secondary resources including but 
not limited to legislations and official statements, reports of international and national 
organizations, newspapers, reports by think-tanks and security firms. the article argues that in line 
with developments in the domestic and international arena, the akp government shifted towards 
the securitization of cyberspace. secondly the article argues that there seems to be two waves of 
securitization and desecuritization within the case. the first wave starts from 2006 through the end 
of 2017 whereby cyber securitization took place within the subunit level and very much connected 
to political and societal sectors. this first wave particularly heightened after the 2016 attempted 
coup and the eventual collapse of the peace process with the pkk. the second wave came in the 
2018 onwards and instead of securitization, there is a desecuritizationn of cyberattacks took place 
mostly at the unit level. in both waves, the desecuritization and securitization is constructed within 
the national security discourse. however in the first wave, a threat to national security is 
constructed and hypersecuritized particularly in relation to developments at the societal level. in 
the second wave, the emphasis is put on the strength of national security therefore the threats and 
cyber-attacks at the unit level that are originated from other states is downplayed in order to 
construct a national pride and strength.   
the first part of the article will give a brief discussion of the copenhagen school and how 
cyberspace fits into the critical security studies in general. the later sections analyze specifically 
how turkey responds to cybersecurity issue; what is constructed as a threat and what is not and 
how the government responds to these threats or threat perceptions.   
copenhagen school of security and cyberspace 
the copenhagen school conceptualized securitization as the discursive and political 
process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political 
community to treat something like an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable 
a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 
1998: 30). in that respect, the ‘referent object’ is the object that is claimed to be threatened and 
holds a general claim on ‘having to survive.’ additionally, there are ‘securitizing actors’ who make 
the claim through speech acts and audience. speech acts point to an existential threat to this 
referent object and thereby legitimize extraordinary measures (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 
32). 
mostly known through barry buzan, ole wæver and jaap dewilde, the importance of 
copenhagen school is that it has a social viewpoint to security studies. copenhagen school more 
elaborately systematized the deepening and widening of the security studies firstly through sectors 
and levels of analysis and secondly through the securitization theory.  
buzan sets out five security sectors and five levels of analysis in security studies. the 
sectors are political, societal, environmental, military and economic. the levels of analysis are; 
systemic, sub-systemic, unit, subunit and finally individual (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998:7).  
the upcoming sections builds cyberspace among those 10 dyads of sectors and levels of analysis 
synthesis and focus on the theory’s strengths and weaknesses regarding particularly the individual 
level and cyber security’s relationship with these main five sectors.  
copenhagen school argues that security is the action that takes politics and frame the issue 
as a special kind of politics or above politics. to put in other words, securitization in that respect 
is a more extreme version of politicization. copenhagen school’s main contribution to security 
studies literature is this concept of securitization. “when an issue is presented as an existential 
threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure” that issue becomes securitized (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 24). this brings forth 
another aspect of securitization as a means of legitimization. according to taureck, three steps are 
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needed for successful securitization: the “identification of existential threats”, “emergency 
action”, and the “legitimization of exceptional measures” (taureck, 2006). thus, securitization is 
applied to legitimize a political action that might not otherwise considered as legitimate. to put it 
in other words, securitization is the “discursive and political process through which an inter-
subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with that threat” (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 25). however, the research 
argues that securitization in addition to being political also sociological process manifest in 
language, history and culture, in effect of interest, power, process, bureaucratic position, and inter-
subjectivity (aydindağ, işiksal, 2018). in different settings, different linguistic rules, and different 
cultures, securitizing moves have different effects which provide various power dynamics (salter, 
2008). securitizing moves use a unique language with a particular heritage, history, and heft - 
fundamentally different from securitizing moves within elite or technocratic settings (salter, 
2011). the sociological view shows that within the configuration of circumstances such as context, 
cultural background, psychological background, and the power that audience and securitizing 
actor brings to interaction, the securitization is better understood as a pragmatic process. 
furthermore, a distinct kind of agency is manifested by the discourse of securitization, which 
reproduces and transforms, through judgement and habit, these structures, in response to problems 
posed by various historical context (emirbayer and mische 1998:970).  
thirdly, the sociological view emphasizes, the mutual constitution of securitizing actors 
and audiences. in that respect, the units of security analysis are the ‘referent object’ which is the 
“object that is/ claimed to be threatened and holds a general claim on ‘having to survive”.’ in 
addition to that, there are ‘securitizing actors,’ through speech act this is the person “who makes 
the claim of pointing to an existential threat to the referent object and therefore legitimizing 
extraordinary measures, often but not necessarily to be carried out by the actor itself” (buzan, 
waever, & de wilde, 1998: 29), ‘functional actor(s) “who affect the dynamics of a sector. without 
being the referent object or the securitizing actor”, this is an actor who significantly influences 
decisions in the field of security, finally ‘audience’; “those who have to be convinced in order for 
the speech act to be successful” (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 26). hence securitization 
process by the agency of securitizing actor inherently involves an individual level of analysis 
dimension due to the fact that the designation of the securitization process relies heavily on the 
agent’s capacity.  
since securitization is mainly explained through speech act then desecuritization means 
the lack of this speech act. thus, not to talk about an issue in terms of security entails the 
desecuritization of that issue. behnke defines desecuritization as “the lack of any securitizing 
speech act” (behnke, 2006), since securitizing speech is considered evidence for securitization, 
lack of such speech must be enough to show desecuritization. in similar vein, oelsner argues one 
way of an issue transcending security language is that the issue may lose being a threatening 
image, because the nature of the threat becomes void for agent and the audience altogether. 
however, this kind of loss of threat perception involve no action on the part of audience or the 
agent; the threat just loses its capability. despite, this is not the case, in addition to the real changes 
in the threat itself what changes is that the intersubjective perceptions of the threat, the outcome 
of this mechanism may well just be indifference (oelsner, 2005). as seen in the next sections of 
the article desecuritization of cyber space at the unit level is constructed in the 2018 onwards 
mostly, in order to prove the strength and ability of the state/regime.  
ironically though, although cyber security is acknowledged in the original a framework 
for analysis it was not considered essential, since it was not considered as an existential threat to 
states due to its lack of “cascading effects on other security issues” (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 
1998:25). fast-forward to second half of 2000s cyber security become a national security concern 
for most of the states and cyber defence became nato’s core task of collective defence (nato, 2020). 
in the move from “computer security” to “cyber security”, the technical discourse is linked to 
securitizing discourse” developed in the specialized arena of national security” (nissenbaum, 
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2005:65).  the main conceptualization of cyber security within the copennhagen school framework 
came from lena hansen and helen nissenbaum’s 2009 article “digital disaster, cyber security, and 
the copenhagen school”, which will be further analyzed in coming sections.  
conceptualization of security sectors 
sectors identify specific types of interaction regarding security. copenhagen school rejects 
the classical security studies limiting security into single – military- sector and construct a more 
radical view that is towards military as well as non-military threats to security. certain values and 
units are particular only to that of certain sectors, it is normal since the main purpose of sectors is 
to differentiate those types of interactions. in that respect, the nature of survival and threat will 
differ across different sectors and types of unit (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 27). in security: 
a new framework for analysis, buzan sets out 5 security sectors as following: military, political, 
societal, economic and environmental. this conceptualization is based on four non-military 
security sectors contributing to an understanding of the non-military aspects of security and 
provide analytical categories in researching those non-military aspects.  as such, looking at 
security studies from a sectoral view can be regarded as 'widening' of the traditional security 
studies.  
societal security concerns the societies. its referent object is largescale collective identities 
that can function independent of the state such as religion and nation. the threats to societal 
security can be migration, vertical and horizontal competition or depopulation. military security 
concerns the “two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state” 
(buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 8). the sector implies that the state is the main referent object 
and the ruling elites are the most important securitizing actors. because force is particularly 
effective as a way of acquiring and controlling a territory, the fundamentally territorial nature of 
the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force (buzan, waever, & 
de wilde, 1998:22). the threats to territorial integrity mostly explained through external and 
military nature. furthermore, military vehicles have an important dominance over the outputs of 
all other sectors (waever, 1993). due to the fact that the most visible part of state behavior, it is 
the most prominent sector among the others. environmental security concerns the “maintenance 
of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human 
enterprises depend” (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998:8).  in the environmental sector 
environment itself and the nexus of civilization are referent objects. the economic sector deals 
with access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare 
and state power. there are many referent objects within the economic sector, state being one of 
those, but other referent objects from different levels of analysis may exist such as in the system 
and subsystem levels; the world bank, the eu, or more abstractly international liberal economic 
order. finally political security concerns the organizational stability of state, systems of 
government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. in the political sector, state sovereignty 
or its ideology is the referent object. sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that 
questions recognition, legitimacy or governing authority. political sector is the widest sector and 
also a residual category.  in a way all security is political and to securitize is also a political act. 
thus, in a sense societal, economic, environment, and military security really mean “political-
societal security”, “political – economic security” and so forth (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 
1998:143).  
cyber sector is mainly built upon the framework of hansen and nissenbaum’s article 
“digital disaster”.  similar to environmental sector and to a degree economic sector, the cyberspace 
sector easily transpass national borders and the threats to cyberspace sector also go beyond the 
national borders. cavelty argues that “cyber security and national security differ most decisively 
in scope, in terms of actors involved and in their referent objects” (dunn cavelty, 2012). hansen 
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and nissenbaum point out that the importance of cyber security in international relations and 
securitization theory as follows:   
cyber securitizations are particularly powerful precisely because they involve a double 
move out of the political realm: from the politicized to the securitized, from the political to the 
technified, and it takes an inter-disciplinary effort to assess the implications of the move, and 
possibly to counter it . . . cyber security stands at the intersection of multiple disciplines and it is 
important that both analysis and academic communication is brought to bear on it. the technical 
underpinnings of cyber security require, for instance, that ir scholars acquire some familiarity with 
the main technical methods and dilemmas, and vice versa that computer scientists become more 
cognizant of the politicized field in which they design and how their decisions might impact the 
(discursively constituted) trade-offs between security, access, trust, and privacy. 
hansen and nissenbaum identify three discourses with different referent objects and 
separate forms of securitization grammer and specific speech acts for securitization. these three 
securitization modes are; hypersecuritization , everyday security practices and technifications.  
hypersecuritization which was originally introduced by buzan (buzan, 2004:172) describe 
an moving securitizaiton beyond the normal levels of threat by defining “ a tendency both to 
exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures”. ın cyber security realm 
hypersecuritization imply the manner in which cyber security discourse hinges on multi 
dimensional cyber disaster scdenerious and neither of these scenerious have so far taken place 
(hansen & nissenbaum, 2009: 1164). everyday security practice meanwhile relies on paris school 
of security studies since the audience is only briefly described in a framework for analysis (1998). 
thierry balzacq developed the concept through explaining the importance of audience since ‘‘the 
success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify with 
the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests,’’ and that ‘‘the speaker has to tune his⁄her language 
to the audience’s experience’’ (balzacq 2005:184). audiences do not exist ‘‘out there’’ but are 
constituted in discourse, and security discourses draw boundaries around the ‘‘we’’ on whose 
behalf they claim to speak, and the ‘‘you’s’’ who are simulta- neously addressed by the linking of 
fears and threats to ‘‘feelings, needs and interests.’’ (hansen & nissenbaum, 2009: 1165). 
importance of everyday securitization in the concept of cyber securitization is that  even those 
who doesn’t own internet or computers in general still are subject to consequences of immidiate 
danger. therefore “experiences of threats are not cases of individual security or crime but are 
constituted as threats to the network and hence the society (hansen & nissenbaum, 2009: 1165). 
technification is a result of logic of securitization since it gives a privilaged role to computer and 
information scientists within the cyger security discourse (hansen & nissenbaum, 2009: 1167). 
inherently it implies the threat is so big and important that ordinary polğiticians or amateurs can 
not handle it.  it constructs the technical as a domain requiring an expertise that the public and 
politicians do not have annd therefore these scientistst become securitizing actors all the while in 
the eyes of the audience having the prerogative of not being accused or questioned if being 
politicized or having an ulterior motive. as seen in the turkish case most of the securitizing o 
desecuritizing actors are owners of cyber security firms or academia belonging to technical fields. 
A) interconnectedness of sectors 
in reality a security issue is not necessarily sector dependent. there is often a dynamic 
transition between different sectors. sectors are lenses focusing on the same world, they are not 
ontologically separate realms. the purpose of desegregating is to put security back to a more 
transparent form (buzan, waever, & de wilde, 1998: 167).  problems on the surface seem to be 
societal might turn out to be motivated by threats of the other four sections. for example, some 
actors such as states may appear in all of the sectors whether as a securitizing actor, functional 
actor or threat. a specific security analysis does not start by separating the world into sectors, it 
starts as a phenomenon and then the units become legitimate referent object for security action 
and finally the pattern of mutual references among units. looking sector by sector may risk of 
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missing intense security dilemmas in cases where a threat in one sector, may be securitized in 
another sector.  
within the cyber security sector, it is often agreed that there are multiple discourses 
however there are different views regarding the referent objects of this sector. one view argues 
that there are separate referent objects within the cyber sector (deibert, 2002) the other view argue 
that multi discursivity arise from “competing articulations of constellations of referent objects” 
(hansen & nissenbaum, 2009:1163; saco, 1999). as explained in turkey’s case below,  particularly 
in line with the gezi park protests and collapse of pkk peace process and the government rhetoric 
on legitimizing the internet surveillance, censorship and blockings of social media platforms 
through referencing “national security” and “protection of child and family”. the case points out 
the linkage between the individual unit of analysis to unit annd subunit levels of analysis. at the 
same time these levels of analysis act collective referent objects, in which the individual of the 
rhetoric is linked to societal sector and the political sector and become those sectors’ referent 
objects.  as argued by saco within the case of september 11,  the discourses are not separate with 
unrelated referent objects but competing articulations of the appropriate individual-state contracts 
of the state (saco, 1999). 
securitization of cyberspace at the subunit level and linkages between sectors  
although legislation against cybercrimes took part early on in turkish penal system, the 
institutionalization and the scope of crimes were relatively limited. the first criminalization was 
mainly technical in nature. the first law was introduced in 1991 in the turkish penal code number 
765, (tck) law no. 3756. it was included into article 20 of the amendments to “the crimes in the 
informatics department”, through the clause 525 / a, b, c and d (tbmm, 1991). the article penalized 
the unlawful seizure of programs, data, and other elements from a computer system along with 
their use, transfer, or copy with the aim of unlawful control of assets. with the turn of the new 
millennium, the penalization also become more elaborated. turkish penal code no. 5237, 
implemented in september 2004, acknowledged the notion of cyber-crime within the framework 
of the penal code both extending its definition, and  section 10 of the turkish penal code, titled 
“information technology (it) crimes” (bıçakcı, ergun, & çelikpala, 2015) included protection 
against stealing, unlawful give or take or use personal data. furthermore the institutionalization of 
cyber security began to show up in 2005 through the establishment of office of crimes committed 
through informatics under the public order branch office and also the directorate of 
telecommunication and communication (tib) under information and communication technologies 
authority (btk) although it was shut down in august 2016.  
the securitization of cyberspace began in the second term of the akp. with a change made 
in 2006, cybercrime is included in the anti-terrorism law no. 3713. the amendment includes the 
following statement: “if the following crimes are committed within the framework of the activity 
of a terrorist organization established to commit a crime for the purposes stated in article 1, such 
as unauthorized access to the system, system blocking, data corruption and modification, some 
other crimes that can be committed through information systems are also included in this article. 
according to the article 2 of the anti-terrorism law, even if individuals are not members of a 
terrorist organization, they are considered terrorists and punished like members of an organization 
if they commit a crime on behalf of a terrorist organization. the reasons for this shift can be found 
in the era that brought several different dynamics at the societal sector that eventually led to cyber-
securitization. the first dynamic was the presidential elections. the existing president was ahmet 
necdet sezer, a former judge, a hardline secularist and whose term in the office would end in 2007. 
as the president was elected with a majority vote of the assembly, this meant that the ruling party 
would have the power to appoint a like-minded ‘conservative-democrat’ president. the akp’s 
presidential candidate was abdullah gül, who was also one of the founding members of the party. 
the effect of the possibility of having an akp-based president, in addition to being the ruling party, 
on societal securitization was twofold.  the first one could be defined as political-military sector 
interrelatedness. as mentioned above, the military has always been a securitizing actor of 
secularism in the turkish political arena, generally considering themselves as the guardians of the 
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republic and ataturk’s reforms, most importantly secularism. on the eve of the presidential 
election, the then chief of general staff, yaşar büyükanit published an ‘online memorandum’ that 
arguably was considered as an indirect military coup. he stated that ‘the problem that emerged in 
the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. the turkish armed forces 
are concerned about the recent situation…the turkish armed forces are a party in those arguments, 
and absolute defender of secularism’ (excerpts of turkish army statements, 2007). in line with the 
online memorandum, president ahmet necdet sezer also became involved in the process, warning 
that the country’s secular system faced its greatest threat since the founding of the republic in 
1923 (rainsford, 2007). here, having the bureaucracy and the military acting as securitizing actors 
implied that having a pro-islamist president created an existential threat to secular identity. the 
securitization of identity was successful since audience response was the mass ‘republic protests’ 
gathered through facebook and twitter and led by several civil society organizations in tandoğan 
square in the capital city ankara. the slogans included ‘turkey is secular and secular it will remain’ 
(türkiye laiktir, laik kalacak) (evrensel.net , 2007). in february 2008, the parliament voted to 
amend turkey’s constitution by eliminating the ban on headscarves being worn on university 
campuses. the headscarf issue, dormant during the first term of the akp government, suddenly 
became the number one issue of desecuritization in early 2008. erdoğan, in a speech act in madrid, 
stated that the ban should be lifted even if the headscarf is used as a political symbol. he added 
that there was no need to wait for the adoption of a new constitution and the problem could be 
solved by a simple ‘one sentence’ constitutional amendment. this dichotomy caused a backlash 
from the secular public and secular elite establishments. they argued that it represents a threat 
against turkey’s secular identity, because it might put pressure on women who choose not to wear 
a headscarf. the islamists, on the other hand, argued that it is a human right to wear religious 
symbols in public spaces. this dichotomy resulted in a closure case for the akp. however, the 
constitutional court did not ban the party and erdoğan was not banned from politics. in fact, akp, 
under erdoğan’s leadership, was extremely careful to function within the limits of secular laws. 
the 2008 ergenekon and 2010 sledgehammer cases changed the dynamics in the civil-military and 
islamic-secular relationships. the ergenekon trials involved high ranking military officials, 
judiciary, and journalists, all alleged to be members of the ergenekon organization. ergenekon was 
a supposedly secular clandestine organization plotting against the akp. operation ‘sledgehammer’ 
was the name of an alleged turkish secularist military coup plan dating back to 2003, in response 
to the akp’s victory.  
the state response to these incidents was increased control of the internet which began in 
2007 through denying access to websites and/or filtering the contents of those websites by either 
blocking the ip addresses or domains, servers and keywords. the securitization rhetoric was based 
on protection of family and children, and in fact turkey’s first internet law no. 5651 entitled 
“regulation of publications on the internet and suppression of crimes committed by means of such 
publications” was approved in may 2007 with the stated objective of protecting families and 
minors. however the offer of “child” and “family” filtering options have been criticized as 
arbitrary and discriminatory, since the child filter obstructs access to facebook, youtube, yasam 
radyo (life radio), the armenian minority newspaper agos, and several websites advocating the 
theory of evolution (freedom house, 2019). the organization's acronym in turkish "tib" which 
controlled online content and direct hosting had become synonymous for internet censorship until 
its closure in the post coup-attempt, also youtube was inaccessible between 2008 and 2010. 
although youtube was officially banned in turkey, the website was still accessible by modifying 
connection parameters to use alternative dns servers. responding to criticisms of the courts' bans, 
in november 2008 the prime minister recep tayyip erdoğan stated ironically "i do access the site. 
go ahead and do the same." in june 2010, turkey's president abdullah gül used his twitter account 
to express disapproval of the country's blocking of youtube, which also affected access from 
turkey to many google services (ntvmsnbc, 2008). the restrictions on internet access had 
accelerated to such an extent that on march 11, 2010, reporters without borders added turkey to 
the list of “countries under surveillance.” the ankara-based association of internet technologies 
filed a complaint about website blocking to the european court of human rights (echr), accusing 
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the turkish authorities of violating freedom of expression the echr (2013) ruled that the turkish 
internet law was against the european convention on human rights (eldem, 2020). 
the second wave came with the spillover effect of arab uprisings in the environmental-
political sector through the gezi park protests of 2013. taksim square and gezi park, as symbols of 
secularism and progress, were planned as urban spaces that would make the republic permeate 
into the daily lives of the newly secular society along with solving the problems of urban 
transportation, hygiene/ecology and aesthetics (baykan & hatuka, 2010). the akp’s attempt at 
building a mosque in the square and erdoğan’s persistence in demolishing the atatürk cultural 
center (akm), the secular symbol of westernization through ballet and other performances became 
the concrete examples of cultural transformation of erdoğan from conservative democracy to 
islamist identity. the protests in itself was a dual securitization and counter securitization move 
from both the secular and religious establishments. the protests which started as a peaceful 
environmental demonstration against the confiscation of a historical park for the building of a 
shopping mall, faced with denial of the right to peaceful assembly and un-proportional police 
attacks. from the very beginning the gezi protests were not solely a crisis at the environmental 
sector (aydindag, 2019:1031). demonstrations were against erdoğan government’s perceived 
religious conservatism. it was the largest mass protest in a decade.  as mentioned earlier one of 
the most problematic area of copenhagen school’s securitization theory was the speech act. the 
non-verbal attempts at securitization such as protests and demonstrations done by actors usually 
considered as audience is sidelined. in copenhagen school structure securitization presents a linear 
dynamic of security construction, starting with a securitizing actor who constructs a referent object 
and a threat. this narrative of existential threat is then either accepted or rejected by an audience, 
thus determining the outcome of the securitizing move.  in practice, however, the process may 
start at any point, with the component parts of the securitization developing simultaneously and 
being mutually constitutive (wilkinson, 2011) and done simultaneously by varying actors whether 
the actors normally in the sphere of audience or functional actors. tayyip erdoğan called protestors 
looters (the guardian, 2013). 
his speech act institutionalized the juxtaposition of national identity and societal identity. 
cyber securitization took on the form of heavy censorship on media and blockading the internet 
websites with an overnight bill that allowed the government to block internet trafficking (reuters, 
2014) further fueled the rage. most infamous media censorship occurred when the mainstream 
media did not broadcast any news regarding the demonstrations for three days. the lack of media 
coverage was symbolized by cnn international covering the protests while cnn turk broadcasting 
a documentary about penguins at the same time (oktem, 2013). the radio and television supreme 
council (rtük) controversially issued a fine to pro- opposition news channels such as halktv for 
their broadcasting of the protests, accusing them of morally, physically and mentally de-
stabilizing the children (özgenç, 2013). news, like security, is a social construction. news reflect 
the construction and inorganic process that reflect the culture in or for which news is produced 
and how the audience should feel about the constructed data (vultee, 2011: 93). whether it’s 
penguins or issuing of a fine and daily ban on channels produce the same securitization attempt 
by the secular audience and later securitizing actors. the centrality of media accounts in forming 
and shaping public opinions point to the relevance of media models in understanding the 
securitization process. balzacq suggests repurposing securitization as a pragmatic act: “a sustained 
argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept the claim that a specific 
development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it” (balzacq, 2009: 60). 
this social-constructivist approach raises several elements to the level of the speech act - the 
“securitizing move” - itself: not just the actor who “speaks security,” but the target audience of 
the move and the context in which it is made; media frame. gezi protests created a rupture in akp’s 
legitimacy of responding to varying societal demands. instead of answering to those demands 
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erdoğan’s marginalizing rhetoric and coercion created to identify erdoğan with the secular-pious 
separation in a cultural polarization reflected in political sector. (mis & aslan, 2018:29)  
aligned with these it wasn’t unexpected that in 2013 national cyber security strategy (ncss) 
was published. the publication focused on information systems of critical infrastructures such as 
electronic communication, energy, water management, critical public services, transportation, and 
banking and finance (eldem, 2020:10). anti-terror law which was already included cyber crimes 
had been extensively used for individuals, social media applications which were operable for 
organizing large gatherings such as twitter, youtube, facebook government agencies put on a close 
surveillance for activities that are deemed against the government. here one can also see the main 
problem with the copenhagen school’s securitization theory: focusing solely on the speech act as 
securitization tool is misleading because there are practices or physical or visual actions that are 
excluded which do not follow the securitizing speech act “format”, but are part of the process 
where meanings of security are communicated and constructed (mcdonald, 2008). in cyber 
securitization issue, the government even without making asformal speech act, through 
surveillance and censorship creates an everyday security practice. with the gezi protests, 
particularly twitter but also other social media platforms have been transformed into “a medium 
of government-led populist polarization, misinformation and lynching” (bulut & yörük, 
2017:4108). internet bots – which are software applications running automated tasks over the 
internet – are also extensively deployed by the government to assist paid individuals (yeşil et al., 
2017). with the law no: 6639 the infamous tib was empowered to block online content without 
court order if there is a complaint from an individual about his/her right to privacy is breached 
and also enhanced the government control over the internet. the prime minister and other relevant 
ministers are empowered to immediately request the removal of internet content and/or blocking 
of a website when a court order for such action has been delayed and a risk to public or national 
security exists (eldem, 2020).  
as a spillover effect of the syrian civil war the government-initiated peace process with 
kurdish terrorist organization pkk became strained. the truce fully collapsed in july 2015, 
following the ceylanpinar incidents in which two turkish police officers were killed by pkk 
terrorists and the government considered this as a casus belli to renewed full-scale warfare in 
south-eastern turkey. furthermore, on july 15, 2016 turkey eluded a coup attempt by feto terror 
organization.  immediately aftermath turkey revised its ncss (2016-2019) and constructed cyber 
security as a national security concept. additionally, the telecommunication and communication 
presidency (tib), which implemented the country’s website blocking law, was shut down under an 
emergency decree, and all of its responsibilities were transferred to the btk. erdoğan described the 
tib as “among the places that has all the dirt”. it was closed due to suspicions that it was used by 
feto as a “headquarters for illegal wiretapping” (freedom house, 2019). the reflection of these as 
cyber-securitization started with social media censorship. internet disruptions mostly targeted the 
southeastern region, where ethnic kurds comprise a majority of the population, and which has seen 
the implementation of a state of emergency and frequent security operations as part of a 
crackdown by turkish security forces on the militant kurdistan workers’ party (pkk). in september 
2016, landline, mobile phone, and internet services were shut down in 10 cities in the region for 
six hours, affecting some 12 million residents; the shutdown came as 28 kurdish mayors were 
being removed from their posts. a month later, the government suspended mobile and fixed-line 
internet service in 11 cities for several days including yüksekova, cizre, sur, silopi, leaving six 
million citizens offline. key public services, such as banks and payment mechanisms, were 
reportedly unavailable. that shutdown coincided with mass protests prompted by the detention of 
local kurdish politicians, including the two co-mayors of diyarbakir. turkey’s internet backbone is 
run by ttnet, a subsidiary of türk telekom that is also the largest internet service provider (isp) in 
the country. türk telekom is partly state owned (freedom house, 2019). additionally, during 
the 2016–17 purges, the secure instant messaging app bylock was accused by the turkish 
government of being used primarily by members of the feto. the government launched 
investigations of over 23,000 citizens for connections to gülen, based solely on evidence that they 
had downloaded or used bylock. some of these investigations resulted in arrests and detainment. 
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however, in december 2017, the government announced that it would investigate 11,480 phone 
numbers had been falsely accused of ties to bylock and gülen, after finding that the accusations 
were induced by unrelated apps embedding a web beacon pointing to the bylock website from 
within. an arrest warrant was also issued against the developer of one of these apps (guardian, 
2017). wikipedia was inaccessible from april 29, 2017 up until january 15, 2020. governmental 
requests for the removal of content both on international social media platforms and on popular 
turkish websites were also widespread. citing security concerns, the turkish government began 
utilizing new tools such as bandwidth throttling, which is the intentional slowing of an internet 
service by an isp (eldem, 2020). this happened during times of security or political crises such as 
the detention of pro-kurdish people’s democratic party (halklarin demokratik partisi, hdp) 
representatives (bianet, 2016), the military coup attempt in 2016, and terror attacks in istanbul, 
ankara, and suruç between 2015 and 2016 (yesil et al, 2017).  in december 2016, the btk ordered 
turkish isps to block popular vpn services and the tor anonymity network to enable the full 
implementation of throttling and banning orders (freedom house, 2017). with law no: 6532 
national ıntelligence service (mit) gained more authority by accessing online/offline “information, 
documents, data, or records from public institutions, financial institutions, and entities with or 
without a legal character.” this would mean that mit would not only be able to get citizens’ 
personal data from any public or private institution (banks, schools, hospitals, isps) but also to 
intercept and store private data on “external intelligence, national defense, terrorism, international 
crimes, and cyber-security” passing through telecommunication channels” without a court order 
(eldem, 2020). in 2018, the turkish parliament passed a law giving the national broadcast media 
regulator, the high council for broadcasting (rtük), authority to monitor and regulate internet 
services. the law requires online video and streaming services to apply for a license to broadcast 
to turkish internet users (reporters without borders, 2018). additionally according to the decision 
published in the official gazette (resmi gazete) on 1 august 2019, online media service providers 
such as netflix, blutv and puhutv, which broadcast series on the internet, came under the control 
of rtük. following this decision, digital broadcasting platforms were obliged to obtain a broadcast 
license to continue broadcasting. with the decision, the rtük administration specified that the 
violation of the rules of broadcasting could result in sanctions for the broadcasters (freedom house, 
2019).  
the situation in turkey is in line with what saco describes as “government violations” of 
personal security where it is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete 
(saco, 1999).  authoritarian regimes and also to some extend non authoritarian ones securitize 
information flows -both domestic and international- as threats to national security, here national 
security is actually regime security, and societal identity in a way that expends threat and referent 
object constellation considerably (deibert, 2002). indeed, in the case of turkey the collapse of 
peace process with pkk led the government to construct cyber security as a state and societal 
security issue. the main societal securitization occurred against the kurdish identity in the 
southeast region of turkey which included cyber securitization through banning social media 
platforms and cutting kurdish people’s communication with the rest of the country and outside 
world. 
from sub-unit level to unit level: desecuritization of cyber-attacks in the 2018 
onwards. 
from 2018 onwards the threat perception of the state mostly shifted from domestic threats 
to foreign threats. indeed since may 2019 there is no report of disruptions to internet took place 
freedom house, 2019).   turkey is the fifth most cyber attacked country in the world following the 
united states, russia, china and india and turkey is the most cyber attacked country in europe (yeni 
çağ, 2019). despite the fact that since 2014 there have been cyber attacks against turkey that are 
originated from other countries such as 2014-dated attack from dragonfly originating from eastern 
europe targeting industrial systems that manage electrical, water, oil gas and data systems (bbc 
news, 2014),  2017-dated wannacry ransomware worm  targeting it systems (ablak, 2017), and 
2014 and 2019-dated iran originated cyber espionages from  chafer group which used spear 
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pfishing, watering hole attacks against the turkish government and security organizations (siber 
savaş cephesi, 2019; haberler.com, 2014),  2018-dated north korean attack by groups “hidden 
cobra” and “lazarus” against turkish firms (haberturk, 2018), 2018-dated state sponsored middle 
eastern hacking group attack targeting telecommunication firms and government embassies 
(cyberscoop, 2018), 2019-dated cloud atlas attack targeting international financial and aviation 
sectors, government agencies and religious organizations (anadolu ajansı, 2019), the turkish 
government desecuritized these issues mostly. between 2017-2018 the cyber attacks mostly 
targeted the health sector whereas in 2019 the targets shifted towards financial and 
telecommunication sectors. in october 2019, one of the most important cyber-attack affecting 
banks and telecommunications institutions in turkey occurred, resulting in a zdnet news of 
illegally trading card details of the joker's stash is made in turkey from users of the site appeared 
to be sold over 455 thousand credit cards. ddos attacks against the public and private sectors 
comprise the majority of cyber-attacks against turkey. the attack targeted garanti bankasi, türk 
telekom, radore and sadece hosting and took days to overcome. türk telekom technology deputy 
general manager yusuf kiraç made a statement regarding the 'cyber attack' on sunday, october 27, 
2019 and said  "we have had to experience one of the cyber attacks that many institutions and 
even states in the world may be exposed to for some organizations in our country. attack on 
turkey's information, communications and technology company, was stopped by the timely 
intervention by the authority in the field of cyber security experts turk telekom” (ulusal kanal, 
2019). as seen here, the speech act at first normalized the attack by saying how it happens in 
almost every country and focused on how well türk telekom acted on the crisis.  
the ransomware threat, which has become widespread in the last few years continued in 
2019. despite these the turkish government and the academic personnel close to the government 
worked to desecuritize the attacks. most of the rhetoric revolve around the dangers of cyber attacks 
and how elaborate the attacks become with further continuing how turkey is very successful in 
overcoming these threats and attacks. for example dtu president prof. ahmet acar argued that 
december 14- dated ddos attack is well taken care of by turkish government. meanwhile, ömer 
fatih sayan, deputy minister of transport and infrastructure, said in a speech given at the beginning 
of the "international cyber shield 2019 exercise" held at the information technologies and 
communication authority (btk), that “cyber attacks are increasing all over the world. we have set 
out to protect them from these attacks and the damage they have caused. we continue our activities 
to ensure national cyber security in line with the realities of the industry and life within the national 
cyber incidents response center (usom)” (vatan, 2019). as seen in the rhetoric of academia and 
government officials, the government  
never holds the sole responsibility of cyber security, contrarily the governments almost 
always encumber private sector with shared responsibility of cyber security within the national 
security framework. if one reason for that is ownership of computer networks, another reason 
perhaps more importantly that the private sector holds the know-how (hansen & nissenbaum, 
2009:1162). when looked at the annual reports of cyber-attacks to usom, it appears that from 2018 
to 2019 the number is doubled. in 2018 the number was 72 thousand 975 whereas in 2019 this 
number is 136 thousand 411. zurich insurance group turkey ceo yilmaz yildiz argued that it is 
getting worse with each passing year of cyber-attacks and turkey is among the countries that 
suffered the most. turkey came in third in the world and ranked second among the biggest risks in 
the world of cyber attacks, and in europe it came in first. emphasizing that cyber attacks were 
initially made to commercial, corporate large companies and public companies, and later, with the 
increase of digital devices, it went down to smes and individuals (hurriyet, 2019). during the 
operation peace spring and operation olive branch cyber attacks against turkey increased. defense 
industry president ismail demir said, "in the peace spring operation, the attempts of the hacker 
groups belonging to the terrorist organization were organized on social media and cyber attacks 
and data leaks against public institutions were identified." said. we have seen cyber attacks on 
institutions and telecom operators, which show that cyber security has become a powerful tool in 
all political and military conflicts for a variety of purposes, from political propaganda to espionage 
activities, denial of services, and destruction of critical infrastructure. necessary measures are 
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being taken with the cyber security ecosystem supported by the ssb through actors such as 
transformation office, information technologies and communication authority, national cyber 
incidents response center, and cyber security projects." (trt haber, 2019). in the cyber threat status 
report of defense technologies engineering and trade inc. (stm), increasing cyber attacks parallel 
the operation olive branch attracted attention. according to the report, terrorist organizations and 
sympathizers resorted to black propaganda, the most known method of psychological warfare, 
especially against the international public opinion, against the operation olive branch, which was 
carried out by the turkish armed forces (tsk) across the border. with the onset of the operation, the 
aggressive groups carried out systematic cyberattacks especially in the provincial organizations 
of public institutions and organizations under the heading "#opturkey". it was stated that the 
terrorist organizations that suffered a significant loss of power and ground during the operation 
with these attacks, which decreased with the completion of the operation, aimed to sabotage the 
superiority of the taf, change the perception and drag the masses into the drive (trt haber, 2019).  
final remarks and conclusion 
as a result, integrating cyber security sector to securitization theory and particularly to critical 
security studies is necessary in order to have a better grasp of societal and human security aspects. 
on the other hand, from a unit level perspective the ongoing organization of the international 
system as a sovereign nation-states community means that state security concerns remain a 
priority; on the other hand, the security problems and their solutions are not only defined in a 
military sense. this necessitates addressing the sources and solutions of security issues that go 
beyond state- centered structures and assumptions. in this article widening and deepening 
processes in the field of security studies have been discussed within the framework of cyber 
security sector.  as seen in the case, cyber sector in the globalized world become much more 
important security sector in the international relations. it not only differentiates in threats, 
securitizing actors and audience from other sectors, but also connected to each of them and also 
each of the levels of analysis almost exclusively similar to environmental sector. 
the conceptualization of desecuritization in the copenhagen school is undertheorized, explained 
very briefly as “moving a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat 
something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for 
exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (buzan & wæver, 2003).  the case study of turkey 
shows that in the cyber desecuritization, the technification concept is more clearly seen since the 
desecuritization is done not just through the political leaders but through professionals of the field 
or through academic personnel.  this also works in two ways: first, since it is not done by 
politicians the credibility of the desecuritization move is much more reliable in the eyes of the 
audience, and therefore the desecuritization act is more successful. secondly, as mentioned in the 
first part, securitization and desecuritization does not necessarily follow a formal speech act, there 
are situations where without a speech taking place these constructions can exist. here the silence 
of politicians also constructs a desecuritization act implying the issue is not worthy of their time 
and explanation. to put it in other words, the silence of politicians and the technificiation process 
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